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Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court of Utah 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Re: U.R.App.P. 24(j) Citation of Supplemental 
Authority in Case No. 20288 
To the Office of the Clerk: 
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant in Case No. 20288 
("Niles") styled as follows: 
STEVEN H. BLUM, as guardian ad litem of 
SCOTT NILES, a minor and incapacitated 
person, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
RODNEY A. STONE, M.D., WESTERN GYNECO-
LOGICAL AND OBSTETRICAL CLINIC, and 
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants and Respondents 
hereby cite the following opinion of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Case No. 84-2724 
("Hargett"), as a supplemental authority pursuant to Rule 
24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
FILED 
OCT 2 4 198? 
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CHERYL HARGETT, as guardian ad litem for 
NATHANIEL HARGETT, a minor, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CHERYL HARGETT, an individual and WESLEY 
HOYT, as guardian ad litem for NATHANIEL 
HARGETT, a minor, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DAVID LIMBERG, M.D., an individual, 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a FILLMORE HOSPITAL and 
FILLMORE HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Hargett pertains to pages 37-39 of PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL in Niles. The reasons for presenting this 
supplemental citation are as follows: 
1. In Hargett, the Tenth Circuit decided a 
question of statutory construction involving similar facts, 
the identical statute and the identical issue now before the 
Supreme Court of Utah in Niles; 
2. The issue that is common to Hargett and Niles 
is whether, given the four-year "savings clause" in U.C.A. § 
78-14-4(2), these minor plaintiffs were entitled to have 
medical malpractice actions commenced on their behalf as 
late as four years after the effective date of the 1979 
amendment to the statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-14-4, 
where said actions were based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of said 1979 
amendment; 
3. In Hargett at 12-13, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the rule in Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977) "tolled plaintiff's 
claim, at least until the 1979 amendment became effective, 
and, subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, the 
savings clause of § 78-14-4 allowed the filing of 
plaintiff's claim" until May 8, 1983; and 
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4. In Niles, the following facts are undisputed: 
(a) plaintiff's action is based upon alleged personal 
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of 
U.C.A. § 78-14-4 as amended in 1979; and (b) plaintiff's 
action was commenced prior to May 8, 1983. 
A courtesy copy of Hargett is attached hereto for the 
convenience of adverse counsel and the Court. 
Sincerely, 
. ."4. 
:don L. Roberts 
C\c^i~*~^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
letter together with a copy of the Opinion of the Tenth 
Circuit cited therein, on this ZH — day of October, 1986, 
to the following: 
Brinton Burbidge, Esq., of and for 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 
Attorneys for Defendant Hospital 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq., of and for 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
Attorneys for Defendants Stone and 
Western Gynecological and Obstetrical 
Clinic 
c &JJ-
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261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Re 8A 272 4.; Harpett, et al 
Dear Counsel: 
v s
- Limburp, et al 
copy of the Enclosed is a ^u> <y UJ tne opinion of the Court in the 
captioned cause. Judgment in accordance with the opinion ha been entered. has 
Sincerel y yours, 
ROBERT I HOECKER, Clerk 
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cc: Honorable David K. Winder 
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PUBLISH 
UNITED STATES COURT u¥ APPEALS 
TENT11 CIRi'UlT 
CHERYL HARGETT, as guardian 
NATHANIEL HARGETT, a minor 
litem for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CHERYL HARGETT, an individual and 
WESLEY HOYT, as guardian ad litem f 
NATHANIEL HARGETT, a minor, 
P 1 a i n t i ! 
vs. 
DAVID LIMBERG, M.D., an individual, 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utax. 
corporation, d/b/a FILLMORE HOSPITAL 
and FILLMORE HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
„ •
 F
 1 L K D 
Umted State, C.nn^^.^ 
*'-••..•) wire:; i f 
SEP 18 jses 
ROBERT L.HOECKER 
Clerk ^"w 
No 64-2724 
APPe£: united States Dist, 
.ne District of Utah 
~ _ o ^  „. n ^  r * 
James -.. black (Fred R. Sylvester, Black & Moore 
brief), Black & Moore, Salt Lake City, Utah, fo-
appellant. 
^ M f 4" 
':th him O1 n the 
Dan S. Bushnell (Dav.i s. tlrickson, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 
with him -:•- "he briei/ Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, Salt Lake 
Cifv. n*-»- or defendants-appellees. 
B f * f I I H I"1 A I" W I iwHiP and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges 
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BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 
The medical malpractice claim filed by plaintiff-appellant 
Cheryl Hargett was dismissed for failure to file it within the 
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. She 
appeals the dismissal on several grounds: (1) the trial court 
erred in determining the date she discovered the alleged 
malpractice; (2) the failure of the mother to timely file an 
action should not bar a minor child from presenting his claim; (3) 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations did not bar this 
particular claim; (4) the statute of limitations violates the 
equal protection provisions of the United States and Utah 
constitutions; and (5) the statute of limitations violates the due 
process and open courts provisions of the Utah constitution. 
Because a determination as to the application of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations in this case adequately 
disposes of the appeal, we address that issue only and reverse the 
trial court's dismissal of the action. 
Nathaniel Hargett, then a 3H month old baby, began having 
health problems about February 5, 1979. On February 12, 1979, his 
mother, Cheryl Hargett, telephoned Dr. David Limberg to report 
that Nathaniel had a fever, diarrhea and other symptoms. Limberg 
diagnosed the illness as a viral infection. As the week 
progressed, Nathaniel's condition worsened. Plaintiff took 
Nathaniel to the hospital and to Limberg's clinic a number of 
times during the week and Limberg examined Nathaniel three or four 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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times* Limberg reaffirmed his opinion that Nathaniel had a viral 
infection that would have to run its course. 
By Friday, February 16, 1979, Nathaniel's condition had 
deteriorated considerably. Limberg examined Nathaniel early that 
day and sent him home with the same diagnosis. Plaintiff 
telephoned Limberg one or two more times that Friday, and on 
Friday night Limberg again told plaintiff that Nathaniel had a 
viral infection. 
Plaintiff took Nathaniel to the hospital on Saturday morning, 
where Limberg saw him. According to plaintiff, Limberg was short-
tempered and sent her and Nathaniel home. Plaintiff, believing 
that Nathaniel was dying, took the baby to the hospital on 
Saturday or Sunday evening. Limberg arrived shortly thereafter, 
examined Nathaniel, and took a blood count and spinal tap. The 
spinal fluid was cloudy, indicating meningitis. Nathaniel was 
then immediately transferred to the care of Dr. Freestone at Utah 
Valley Hospital. Nathaniel was comatose for his first seven days 
at Utah Valley Hospital. After three weeks he was released for a 
few days, but was readmitted and remained hospitalized for three 
to three and one-half months. 
Nathaniel has been diagnosed as presently having 
developmental delays, speech and language delays, a hearing 
impediment, sensory and neural loss on the left side of his body, 
a discrepancy in leg length due to improper muscle growth on his 
-31-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
left side, and some mental retardation. Plaintiff alleges that 
these conditions are all attributable to the meningitis. 
Plaintiff brought this diversity suit in federal court in 
Utah individually and as guardian ad litem of Nathaniel on 
February 16, 1983. 28 U.S.C. S 1332. She alleged medical 
malpractice based on a failure to properly diagnose meningitis. 
Limberg moved for dismissal, contending that the suit was barred 
by the statute of limitations. The trial court treated the motion 
for dismissal as a summary judgment motion and dismissed the 
action. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with this court. 28 
U.S.C. S 2107. 
Because this is a diversity suit, we apply the relevant Utah 
statute of limitations, Guaranty Trust Co, v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 
108-09 (1945), as well as the applicable Utah tolling provisions. 
Cook v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 800, 802-03 (10th Cir. 
1985). In this case, the relevant statute of limitations is found 
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 
to 78-14-16 (1986 Supp.), which was passed in 1976 as a response 
to the rising number of medical malpractice claims and the 
resultant increase in health care costs and reduction in health 
care services. The limitation provision of the Malpractice Act 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence* . . . 
* * * 
(2) The provisions of this section shall 
apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under section 78-12-
36 or any other provision of the law, and 
shall apply retroactively to all persons . . . 
and to all health care providers and to all 
malpractice actions against health care 
providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of 
this act; provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have been 
commenced after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within the unelapsed 
portion of time allowed under former law; but 
any action which under former law could have 
been commenced more than four years after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the effective 
date of this act* 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1986 Supp.). This amended version of § 
78-14-4 expressly refers to the Utah general tolling statute, Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-12-36 (1986 Supp.J.1 
"
!The following chronology of events will aid in the analysis 
of this case: 
April 1, 1976—The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, as 
originally enacted, becomes effective; 
August 16, 1977—The Utah Supreme Court renders its 
decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977); 
February, 1979—The events giving rise to the 
malpractice claim in this case occur; 
Section 78-12-36 provides in pertinent part: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for 
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause 
of action accrued, either: 
(1) Under the age of majority; . . . 
* * * 
The time of such disability is not a part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
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May 8, 1979—The amendment to S 78-14-4 becomes 
effective; 
February 16f 1983—Plaintiff files the malpractice claim 
in federal district court. 
When the Malpractice Act was originally enacted in 1976, S 
78-14-4 did not include the phrase "under section 78-12-36 or any 
other provision of the law." In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court 
rendered its decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977). In Scott, the court held that 
the limitation period on all claims of minors was to be tolled 
until the majority of the claimant. At the time of the alleged 
injuries to Nathaniel in February, 1979, the Scott rule tolled the 
provisions of S 78-14-4 until Nathaniel reached majority. The 
legislature amended § 78-14-4 in May, 1979, with the intent of 
overturning the effect of Scott in the malpractice area. The 
amendment added the reference to § 78-12-36 in order to expressly 
include minors' claims within the limitation provision of § 78-14-
4. 
Assuming that the amendment precludes the application of the 
Scott rule in medical malpractice claims, minors may no longer 
invoke the benefits of S 78-12-36. Although the alleged injuries 
to Nathaniel occurred prior to the passage of the amendment to § 
78-14-4, plaintiff filed her malpractice claim in February, 1983, 
after the amendment to § 78-14-4 became effective. Appellees thus 
contend that the limitation provisions of the statute bar the 
filing of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff asserts that the amended 
version of § 78-14-4 should not apply to this injury which 
-6~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. 
Alternatively, plaintiff contends that even if the amendment is 
applied in this case, the saving provision of S 78-14-4(2) allows 
the filing of the claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Scott in 
1977, subsequent to the passing of the original Malpractice Act. 
Plaintiff contends that the Scott decision required the 
application of the general tolling provisions in all minors1 
claims, including medical malpractice claims. Appellees, on the 
other hand, assert that Scott should not be read so broadly, and 
that its application should be limited to the particular facts of 
Scott involving the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Scott decision dealt with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, and therefore did not specifically address the limitation 
provision of the Malpractice Act. Nevertheless, the Utah court 
unequivocally stated that "a minor claimant is justly entitled to 
the protection afforded by said Section 78-12-36(1), U.C.A., 1953, 
in all cases, including notice requirements of the type contained 
in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a 
denial of due process and equal protection." Scott, 568 P.2d at 
748 (emphasis added). The Utah court based its ruling on the 
"abundantly clear" general legislative intent to protect the 
claims of minors. Id. 
In Scott, the court noted that its previous decisions had 
held that the various specific statutes of limitation took 
precedence over the general tolling statute, but that the general 
-7r Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tolling provisions would now apply in all cases involving minors 
• (notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of this court." 
Scott, 568 P.2d at 747-48. Also/ the language in Scott providing 
that S 78-12-36(1) applied "in all cases, including notice 
requirements of the type contained in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act" indicates that the court intended its holding to 
2 
have application beyond the facts present in Scott, Scott, 568 
P.2d at 748 (emphasis added). The Utah court could have narrowed 
its holding or carved out specific exceptions to the broad 
application of the tolling provision, yet it chose not to do so. 
Thus, pursuant to Scott, the general tolling provisions of § 78-
12-36 would apply to all claims of minors, including medical 
malpractice claims, and the limitation provisions of § 78-14-4 
would be tolled until Nathaniel reached majority. 
The Utah Legislature apparently recognized the possibility 
that Scott would allow the tolling of § 78-14-4 until the majority 
of the minor claimant, and endeavored to preclude such an 
application of Scott. In 1979, the legislature amended § 78-14-4 
to include the phrase "under section 78-12-36 or any other 
provision of the law" in order to include minors1 claims in the 
limitation provisions of S 78-14-4. The express purpose of the 
amendment was "to overturn a Supreme Court decision which has 
The Utah court has in fact expressly used the reasoning of 
Scott to toll the statute of limitations in an area wholly 
separate from the Governmental Immunity Act; the area of paternity 
and child support actions under the Utah Uniform Paternity Act. 
See Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1981). 
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recently come down," Representative Judd, Transcript of 
Discussion and Vote in Utah House,of Representatives at Third 
Reading of B.B. 164 (Feb. 13, 1979). Both parties concede that 
the Supreme Court decision referred to above is the Scott 
decision. (Appellantfs brief at 19, Appellees' brief at 17). The 
1979 amendment was passed by the Utah Legislature during the 
session which adjourned March 8, 1979. Because Utah acts take 
effect 60 days after adjournment of a session, the 1979 amendment 
became effective on May 8, 1979. Utah Const., Art. VI, § 25. See 
also Utah Code Ann., Parallel Tables Volume, pp. 80, 85 (1986 
Supp.). 
The appellees claim that this amendment precludes the 
possibility of tolling and is to be applied retroactively, thus 
barring plaintiff's claim. Even if we assume that the amendment 
does effectively preclude the application of § 78-12-36 to medical 
malpractice claims and that it may be applied to plaintiff's 
claim, S 78-14-4 does not operate to bar this action. 
Utah law generally calls for the application of the law which 
is in effect as of the date of the filing of the original 
Representative Judd also stated: 
However, as with any good law, sometimes it needs to be 
interpreted by the Court before you really know whether 
or not you have done what you have wanted to do and so 
the original bill has now been interpreted by the Court 
and its impact has been felt in another area of the law. 
And as a result of that, we come to you now with the 
amendment which suggests that, despite what it says in 
178-14-4] it does not impact [78-12-36] which is another 
area of the statute of limitations, and so we are making 
that change in order to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision which has recently come down. 
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complaint. Archer v. Utah State Land Board. 392 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1964). £>ee also Marshall v. Industrial Commission of State 
of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). Section 78-14-4, as 
amended, was in effect at the date of filing and, therefore, we 
apply it to this action. However, even when we apply § 78-14-4, 
as amended, to the occurrences which form the basis of this case, 
it does not bar plaintiff's claim. The saving clause in S 78-14-
4(2) allows a claimant whose claim has accrued prior to the 
effective date of the Act to commence his suit within the time 
remaining under the limitation period that was applicable to such 
claimant before the Malpractice Act became effective. These 
accrued claims must be commenced no later than four years from the 
effective date of the Act. 
Appellees argue that the effective date of the Act is April 
1, 1976, and that the saving provision of § 78-14-4(2) only allows 
the commencement of accrued actions through April 1, 1980. 
Appellees also contend that the substance and effect of the 1979 
amendment should relate back to the effective date of the original 
Act, with no break in continuity between the enactment date of the 
original Act and the amendment. To accept this argument would be 
to ignore the effect of the Scott ruling subsequent to the passing 
of the original Act, as well as the established limitations on the 
power of the legislature. 
As noted above, the Scott decision permitted the tolling of 
the limitation period for a minor's cause of action until that 
minor reached the age of majority. The Scott rule applied to all 
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claims involving minors, including medical malpractice claims, at 
least until the/legislature amended the Malpractice Act in 1979. 
Thus, prior to the 1979 amendment, Utah law required the tolling 
of the limitation period set forth in S 78-14-4 until the minor 
claimant reached majority. 
The 1979 amendment is a legislative attempt to overturn the 
Scott decision, and, assuming the amendment successfully achieved 
that purpose, constitutes a clear change in Utah law. While Utah 
law, ^under appropriate circumstances, will allow the enactment of 
a statute that "has a reasonable retrospective application upon 
matters or actions prior to its enactment or prior to [the 
legislature's] convening," it will not allow the legislature to 
"pass an act which would become a law prior to the date it was 
duly convened." Mecham v. State Tax Commission, 410 P.2d 1008, 
1009 (Utah 1966)(holding that the effective date of an amendment 
to the Utah income tax statutes was 60 days after the adjournment 
of the legislature, or May 11, 1965, although the act had 
retroactive effect back to January 1, 1965). 
To allow the effective date of the amended version of § 78-
14-4 to,relate back to the original Act's effective date of April 
1, 1976, as appellees urge, would allow the enactment of a law 
prior.,to the date the legislature convened to consider the law, 
and is,forbidden by Mecham. Such a construction would also 
completely igncre the intervening existence of the Scott decision 
as the compelling reason behind the 1979 amendment. Thus, the 
change in Utah law did not become effective until the enactment of 
-11-
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the 1979 amenamenti and to the extent S 78-14-4, as amended, 
overturns scott and prevents the application of the general 
tolling provisions of S 78-12-36, the effective date of the Act is 
May 8, 1979. 
Applying this effective date of May 8, 1979, to the saving 
clause in § 78-14-4(2), it becomes clear that this case 
constitutes a malpractice action "based upon alleged personal 
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act." 
Furthermore, under "former law," or the law in effect prior to the 
effective date of the Act (in this case Scott), plaintiff's claim 
could have been commenced after Nathaniel reached majority, well 
after the effective date of the Act. Pursuant to S 78-14-4(2), 
plaintiff is given the unelapsed portion of the time allowed under 
Scott to bring the claim. However, since this unelapsed portion 
of time would allow plaintiff to bring the claim more than four 
years after the effective date of the Act, plaintiff is given up 
to four years from the effective date to commence the action. 
Thus, plaintiff had until May 8, 1983, to file the malpractice 
suit. The original complaint was filed February 16, 1983, and 
therefore is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
In summary, we hold the Scott rule tolled plaintiff's claim, 
at least until the 1979 amendment became effective, and, 
subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, the saving clause of 
S 78-14-4 allowed the filing of plaintiff's claim. This 
determination renders moot the issues as to when plaintiff 
actually discovered the injury and whether the mother's failure to 
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bring a timely claim should also bar the child from filing suit. 
Furthermore, we express no opinion as to whether the 1979 
amendment did in fact successfully overturn Scottt whether the 
amendment may properly be given retroactive effect, or whether the 
limitation statute violates the United States and Utah 
constitutions. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
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